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REPRENDRE LE DEUXIEME SEXE
This special issue of the Bulletin focuses on Simone de
Beauvoir's Le deuxieme sexe (LDS), published in 1949. The last few
years, especially 1999, have brought a number of articles, books,
special journal issues, and conferences on Beauvoir, all of which
testifies to a wide sense of appreciation for Beauvoir and her work.
Why our issue now, after the celebrations are over? Hasn't everything
already been said about Beauvoir and in particular about her most
famous book? We don't think so. The point is to engage it. In other
words, this is not a belated birthday card. With a growing number of
feminist scholars who are part of an international Beauvoir renaissance,
we believe that Beauvoir's LDS has not yet been taken seriously
enough. 1
Two factors seem to be most crucially at issue: for one, there is
the purely technical matter of the text' s inadequate English translation
(more on that below). Second and more important, the relationship
between feminism and philosophy remains only problematically
aI1iculated. This directly affects LDS. Reading the dismissive
comments by numerous scholars in both fields, it is clear that LDS does
not fit either discipline. A queer hybrid, it situates itself elsewhere. To
reclaim it, or rather to claim it truly for the first time, would mean to
rethink not only the relation between feminism and philosophy but also
those fields themselves. This is a project that now seems weH under
way and it is these conditions that are making possible a new
engagement with LDS.
But the obstacles are tremendous. For many feminists,
Beauvoir' s positions are, to say the least, dated and her text deserves
attention only as a historical document. Dubbed a "feminist bible," the
text was resurrected twenty years after its first publication and helped to
consolidate a second wave women's movement whose concerns have
now given way to those of a new generation of feminists. Beauvoir' s
text thus is radical only in the original sense of the word as having been
at the origin of a political project that now belongs to the paste
Consequently the privileged place for encountering LDS remains the
college "History of Feminism" class. Those few feminists who over the
years have tried to retrieve LDS from its intennent as a historic
monument and suggested that we not only read it as an articulation of
1 See in particular Bauer (2001) and Moi (1999).
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theory but also explore some of its insights as avenues for a revitalized
contemporary feminist theory, often encounter strong resistance: "Why
go back there? Beauvoir doesn't even like women! Look at her
comments on lesbians!" "Go back to her theory of the body? I think
we have already done better than that!" "She contradicts herself all the
time!" And finally, there always is the ultimate blow, the damning
reference to Sartre: Beauvoir would have adopted wholesale Sartrean
concepts, and who could ever think Sartre a feminist? As a result, the
position Margaret Simons took already in 1979 on the occasion of
LDS'thirtieth anniversary is still provocative:
Beauvoir't s analysis of woman' s oppression in The Second Sex
is open to many criticisms ... Still, we have no theoretical
source of comparable scope that stimulates us to analyze and
question relentlessly our situation as women in so many
domains: literature, religion, politics, work, education,
motherhood, and sexuality. As contemporary theorists explore
the issues raised in The Second Sex, we can see that in a sense
all feminist dialogue entails a dialogue with Simone de
Beauvoir. And a discussion with her can be a way of locating
ourselves within our feminist past, present, and future.
(Simons 8)
Philosophers' hesitations about the status of Beauvoir' s text
ironically used to crystallize around the same issues that bothered
feminists, albeit with a difference: while many feminists consider
Beauvoir' s positions to be out of date politically, philosophers have
tended to see too much politics. The text would more properly belong
to sociology. And even when they have acknowledged a philosophie
Beauvoir, that Beauvoir more often than not takes the form only of a
derivative Sartre. To be sure, today' s standard dictionaries and
encyclopedias of philosophy no longer outright exclude her, but as a
philosopher in her own right Beauvoir still seldom qualifies. In other
words, Beauvoir' s status as a philosopher is as uncertain as her status as
a bona fide feminist.
But things are changing. One sign that a general re-evaluation
of Beauvoir as a philosopher is currently under way is the entry on
Beauvoir in the new Routledge Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy (1998). It
runs over seven columns and was authored by the Beauvoir scholar Eva
Lundgren-Gothlin. Not coincidentally, Lundgren-Gothlin is among the
growing number of feminist philosophers whose work is reshaping the
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diseipline. One ean perhaps diseern three distinet ways in whieh that is
happening: as some philosophers import a feminist instrumentarium and
use that eneounter to further sharpen those instnlments, the way ludith
Butler does, others reeast apparently feminist issues as fundamentally
philosophie ones in the manner of, for instanee, Naney Bauer and Debra
Bergoffen; still others are inseribing Beauvoir into a philosophie
tradition. Henee the unpreeedented number of reeent studies on
Beauvoir as a philosopher. Usually these analyses take the form of
identifying lines of influenee: who influeneed whom? Given the life-
long relationship between Beauvoir and Sartre, his name figures
prominently in this diseussion: Did Sartre develop his ideas about the
Other and his eoneern with individual soeialization during ehildhood
(as in his study of Genet) on the basis of work Beauvoir had been
pursuing earlier, or did Beauvoir appropriate Sartrean eoneepts and
ideas? Whieh is the more original of the two? Reeently this pursuit of
genealogies has broadened so that Beauvoir now is being eonneeted
also to other eentral modem philosophers sueh as Descartes, Hegel,
Marx, Nietzsehe, and Merleau-Ponty. Yet one wonders what this focus
on "influenee" means. Am I a philosopher by virtue of using other
philosophers' ideas as one uses a set of tools? Or am I a philosopher
only in the more restricted sense of auctor, to invoke Bourdieu's
distinction between the auctor who ereates a new idea and the equally
necessary but differently eharged lector who keeps it alive by teaching
others about it? Beauvoir herself had something interesting to say
about this. Insisting on the philosophieal aspect of LDS, she told
Margaret Simons in 1985:
. .. while I say that I am not a philosopher in the sense that I
am not the ereator of a system, I' m still a philosopher in the
sense that I've studied a lot of philosophy, I have a degree in
philosophy, I've taught philosophy, I'm infused with
philosophy; and when I put philosophy into my books it' s
beeause that's a way for me to view the world; and I can't
allow them to eliminate that way of viewing the world, that
dimension of my approach to women, as Mr. Parshley [the
Ameriean translator of LDS] has done. (Simons 93)
Clearly, it never occurred to Beauvoir to consider her book as
anything other than a philosophieal text that broke new ground-
despite her assertion in the same breath that she is "not a philosopher in
the sense that [she is] not the creator of a system." In LDS she created
something else, namely a form that brings into dialogue philosophy and
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women's concrete experience in the service of a larger utopian project
of human brotherhood. To get there she had to do more than to repeat
the ideas of other thinkers. As Nancy Bauer shows in her recent
Simone de Beauvoir: Philosophy and Feminism (2001), Beauvoir's
borrowings are appropriations that create genuinely new possibilities.
Virtual Beauvoirs
When LDS first appeared in France in 1949, it was greeted as a
scandal. Not even the circle of leftist intellectuals within which
Beauvoir moved could quite stornach her analysis ofwoman's situation.
The story ofthe two volumes' translation into English is weIl known:
Blanche Knopf, wife of the American publisher Alfred A. Knopf,
happened to be visiting Paris during the initial uproar over LDS and
brought it back to New York with her. It might produce healthy sales
for her husband's firm also, especially since, in Mrs. Knopfs
estimation, it "was a modem-day sex manual, something between
Kinsey and Havelock Ellis" (qtd. in The Second Sex xiv). It would
certainly be popular with the college crowd. Her husband shared her
views about potential sales and target audience but complained about
the text's length. The author, he opined, "certainly suffers from verbal
diarrhea . . . 1 can hardly imagine the average person reading the whole
book carefully. But I think it is capable of making a very wide appeal
indeed and that young ladies in places like Smith who can afford the
price, which will be high, will be nursing it just as students of my
generation managed somehow to get hold of Havelock Ellis" (quoted in
The Second Sex, xv).
By the time H.M. Parshley- Professor Emeritus of Zoology at
Smith College, expert on human reproduction, and frequent as weIl as
competent consultant for scientific translations from French-had
completed his translation, the text had become more efficient indeed:
charged to cut and condense where he could, Parshley omitted about
half of the "History" chapter, almost thirty-five pages of the chapter on
nlarriage and tightened passages elsewhere too.2 lnitially he tried to
discuss these changes with Beauvoir. But not expecting a translation
that would be edited and abridged, Beauvoir soon lost interest in the
project and effectively stopped communicating with Parshley. Her only
consolation now was the money the English translation would bring.
Oddly enough changes to the original were not marked at all in the
2 Simons speaks of a total of "almost a hundred pages [that] were cut
from the original French edition" (93).
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translation. Beauvoir had asked Parshley to at least indicate in the
"Translator's Note" the fact that changes had been made as weIl as their
extent and to note also that she had strongly objected to all alterations,
but the final printed version does not include any such information
(Simons 93-94).
If Parshley ultimately lacked control over the resulting text' s
length and had to accept the publisher' s instroctions, he is nonetheless
directly accountable for the translation' s many conceptual problems,
which have prompted generations of readers to accuse Beauvoir of
conceptual imprecision and to find her text so barren a ground for
advanced feminist theory. As a zoologist-even a specialist on human
reproduction-but not a philosopher trained in the Continental tradition
and familiar with Hegel, Heidegger, and the new existentialism,
Parshley could hardly be expected to produce an accurate text. To his
credit he tried to do his best by leaming about Continental philosophy
as he went along. But his reading did not save him from committing
sometimes egregious errors that effectively invert Beauvoir' s original
meanings. As a result, readers of The Second Sex have encountered a
palimpsest.A severely distorted version of LDS, it lacks in Margaret
Simons' words the original's "philosophical integrity" (Simons 93).
Unfortunately problems in translation are the role rather than
the exception with Beauvoir's text. As Anna Alexander reports in this
issue, Japanese-Ianguage readers found their "Beauvoir" to use
"femininity" and "motherhood" interchangeably; Swedish-Ianguage
readers never even suspected that Beauvoir commented extensivelyon
the lesbian, the mother, and the prostitute, since those chapters had been
silently dropped. The fate of LDS in Germany is disturbingly
representative. A full German translation was available in West
Germany as early as 1951, but like Parshley, the German translator also
had trouble recognizing and rendering key existentialist concepts.
Existentialism was relatively new then and the attitude toward
translation used to be much more relaxed than it is today. Inaccurate
translation therefore seemed almost inevitable. It is impol1ant to
emphasize that this was aglobai phenomenon that affected all French
existentialist texts and did not constitute, as one might perhaps suspect,
a sexist response to Beauvoir in particular (a nurrlber of important
existentialist novels are currently being re-translated because the earlier
German translations have proved so deficient). At any rate, Beauvoir's
text came out severely distorted. Witness the translation of the text' s
most famous line, the opening sentence of volume two, "Lived
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Experience." "On ne nait pas femme, on le devient" turned into "Man
wird nicht als Frau geboren, man wird dazu gemacht," which effectively
erases Beauvoir' s central insight and makes her appear to argue its
exact opposite. By stressing woman's becoming through socialization
and each individual' s active participation in that formation, Beauvoir
precisely rejects the much more deterministic understanding that speaks
out of the fornl "gemacht." Women are precisely not mere helpless
victims, not simple products of the conditions they encounter (which is
why Beauvoir thinks historical materialist accounts of women' s
situation always fall ShOlt). Instead, their position is rather more
ambiguous and therefore also more hopeful. As Sartre puts it in the
volume' s epigraph, "A moitie victimes, amotie complices, comme tout
le monde." Whatever a woman becomes, she also chooses herself that
way. This is of course not an argument for voluntarism but rather one
for responsibility and agency, however limited that space for agency
may turn out to be for the concrete individual. Beauvoir's women
always remain agents; even their most self-defeating behaviors are
active choices, free responses to the ever-present temptation to flee
one's responsibility and the weight and uncertainty that attach to
experiencing oneself as human transcendence. In other words, to
choose immanence over transcendence, to accept being man's Other,
carries a considerable reward: someone else will justify my existence
(LDS I: 21):
Refuser d'etre l' Autre, refuser la complicite avec l'homme, ce
serait pour elles renoncer atous les avantages que l' alliance
avec la caste superieure peut leur conferer. L'homme-suzerain
protegera materiellement la femme-lige et il se chargera de
justifier son existence: avec le risque economique elle esquive
le risque metaphysique d'une liberte qui doit inventer ses fins
sans secours. En effet, acote de la pretention de tout individu
as'affirmer comme sujet, qui est une pretention ethique, il y a
aussi en lui la tentation de fuir sa liberte et de se constituer en
chose: c' est un chemin nefaste car passif, aliene, perdu, il est
alors la proie de volontes etrangeres, coupe de sa
transcendance, frustre de toute valeur. Mais c'est un chemin
facile: on evite ainsi l'angoisse et la tension de l'existence
authentiquement assumee. L'homme qui constitue la femme
comme une Autre rencontrera donc en elle de profondes
complicites.
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But the first German translation effectively erases a take on
women' s situation that is more complex than invoking overpowering
social forces or even juxtaposing deterministic social structures and
individual agency. In Beauvoir's model, the individual's agency is also
enlisted on the side of unfreedom as women are being tempted into
freely consenting to being an Other. Fortunately, a complete, new,
critical German translation-one that restores Beauvoir' s original
meanings and accurately translates the philosophical terminology-
appeared in 1992 under the direction of the Beauvoir specialist Irene
SeIle.3 For more on the vicissitudes ofthe German Beauvoir, see the
testimony in this volume by Florence Herve. How much this new
translation has helped to reinvigorate feminist thinking within the
German academy seems difficult to gauge. On the other hand, feminist
philosophy has clearly been a fast growing area of scholarship. In
particular, there is increasing interest in feminist phenomenological
approaches to the problem of the body and errlbodied experience, the
very issue that dominates volume two of LDS. Which brings us back to
LDS in its English incamation.
3 SeIle, a former East German citizen had been lobbying cultural
authorities for years to get LDS published in East Germany. Because
official circles were mindful of Georg Lukacs' condemnation of
existentialism and did not want to risk offending the French
Communist Party, which had so unmistakably rejected LDS
immediately following its publication, the state' s censorship body
blocked the book' s publication for almost forty years. Six of
Beauvoir' s other books had become available between 1967 and
1983. The East Berlin publisher Volk und Welt finally released LDS
in the West German translation of 1951 in December 1989, one
month after the Wall had come down. But as SeIle reports, the fact
that Das Andere Geschlecht was not available in bookstores did not
prevent its discussion. Academic libraries possessed some French
and German copies, and iIlegaIly obtained copies circulated in
intellectual and oppositional circles. Throughout the 1980s East
German women met in church groups to discuss feminist issues and to
reflect on what to many seemed steadily consolidating patriarchal
structures. That is where many of them encountered Beauvoir. SeIle
herself traveled between the country's church groups to give lectures
and initiate discussion. For more on the hidden history of an East
German Beauvoir, see Irene SeIle, "Publication et reception du
Deuxieme sexe en R.D.A.: Compte rendu d'une experience vecue,"
Lendemains 94 (1999): 92-101.
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Will H.M. Parshley's text soon be similarly replaced by an
accurate translation? We do not know. So far the current copyright
holder refuses to bring out a new complete and corrected translation
despite heavy and persistent lobbying. Sales of The Second Sex
apparently still satisfy the publishers as they can rely on continued
steady interest in Beauvoir' s book as a historie icon. With the spread of
women's studies there will always be something of a demand
regardless of the quality of the translation, which is very different from
the situation in Germany where women's studies functions differently
and where, as Herve reports in this volume, only some 610,000 copies
have been sold over aperiod of 50 years. Perhaps sufficient then as a
historical docunlent, as a text that could give much-needed new impetus
to American feminist theory, engage feminist philosophers, and spur
wide discussion, the existing The Second Sex is useless. To be sure,
crucial passages are appearing in good English translation as more
scholars work on LDS, but none of that fundamentally changes the need
for a complete critical edition.4 The good news is that it may finally be
on its way. In 1999, the German feminist and scholar Ingrid Galster
organized a conference at the Catholic University of Eichstätt as a first
step toward realizing that project (see Herve in this volume). If it
succeeds, the English-Ianguage scholarly edition will be a collaborative
work translated by a large international group of feminists that reads
like a who is who of contemporary feminism: Naomi Schor, Margaret
Mitscherlich-Nielsen, Elisabeth Roudinesco, Kate Millett, Judith
Walkowitz, Elisabeth Badinter, Marie-Jo Bonnet, Margaret Simons,
Rita Süssmuth, Alice Schwarzer, Julia Kristeva, Fran~oise Heritier, and
Eva Lundgren-Gothlin among others.
Beauvoir as Avantgarde?
Let' s bracket for the moment the quarrelover whether
Beauvoir qualifies as a first-rate feminist theorist or a first-rate
philosopher and move instead to two slightly different questions: from a
feminist perspective, what does LDS do and why has it been so difficult
to see? Let' s start with the latter.
Clearly some of Beauvoir' s positions do not sit weIl with many
contemporary feminists. As we look at the complaints, we seem to be
able to distinguish a common theme that could be captured in a single
accusatory phrase: Beauvoir is male-identified and she hates being a
4 See for example Moi (1999) and Bauer (2001).
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woman. Given what LDS shows about the cultural production of
femininity, we think even Beauvoir would agree- but only because
these judgments mean one thing against the background of her
argument and quite another in a context that remains inscribed with
second-wave feminist thought (there is of course a profound irony in the
fact that Beauvoir is generally celebrated as the mother of second-wave
feminism; on the other hand, the simultaneous absence of serious
engagement with her work might also make one suspect that she is
merely an honorary mother). Where second-wave feminists would
diagnose self-hatred, Beauvoir sees an assertion of transcendence;
where the former detect an appalling lack of solidarity, the latter sees
only an uncompromising rejection of immanence. Refusing to be a
woman, refusing to congeal into an object/Other, and rejecting the
prison of femininity, Beauvoir insists on her freedom as a subject that is
engaged in a project and a becoming:
Tout sujet se pose concretement atravers des projets comme
une transcendance; il n' accomplit sa liberte que par son
perpetuel depassement vers d' autres libertes; il n' y a d' autre
justification de I" existence presente que son expansion vers un
avenir indefiniment ouvert. Chaque fois que la transcendance
retombe en immanence il y adegradation de l'existence en
« en soi », de la liberte en facticite; cette chute est une faute
morale si elle est consentie par le sujet; si elle lui est infligee,
elle prend la figure d'une frustration et d'une oppression; elle
est dans les deux cas un mal absolu. Tout individu qui a le
souci de justifier son existence eprouve celle-ci comme un
besoin indefini de se transcender. (LDS I: 31)
Is the subjectivity Beauvoir describes here something that necessarily
belongs to all men? Only if they are not trapped in inauthenticity,
which Beauvoir defines as fleeing the exacting demands of one"s
freedom and seeking refuge in the certainty of a thing. Woman as
Other functions as such a thing for men. Once men realize that any
meaning their lives will have they will need to create themselves, that
they must define their projects without any guarantees but still in full
responsibility, many react with fear and use woman as the Other to
regain (a false) solid ground: "pour I'homme pris entre le silence de la
nature et la presence exigeante d' autres libertes, un etre qui soit ala fois
son semblable et une chose passive apparatt comme un grande tresor"
(LDS 11: 575). In sum, Beauvoir's desire for transcendence is a sign of
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male identification only in an abstract sense since in their concrete lived
experience most men recoil from its challenges.
At the same time as many feminists responded with suspicion
to what Beauvoir argued in LDS (excepting her immensely useful
notion of woman as the Other), they also questioned her method:
Beauvoir does not make any appreciable effort to draw on other
women's work, at least not when it comes to theory. For that she relies
exclusively on male philosophers. The issue came up in a 1979
interview with Margaret Simons and Jessica Benjamin: who were her
feminist theory models, didn't she rely also on Virginia Woolf?
Beauvoir' s off-hand response reveals that this question was foreign to
her way of thinking. She had enjoyed reading A Room 0/ One 's Own,
but relied on it? She also had read To the Lighthouse but couldn't
recall it very welle ..
I cannot say that there was someone in whose path I followed.
The closest to me on this plane was, certainly, Virginia Woolf.
. . . No, I cannot say that I was influenced by anyone in
particular in The Second Sex ... Or perhaps 1 was influenced
by everyone. It was my stance with respect to the world and to
literature, as I saw them. (Simons 12).
The many women who do appear in LDS serve as informants. They
furnish the text' s raw material, its evidence: testimony culied from
medical reports, diary entries, and women's novels. Beauvoir's women
are certainly not silent-their voices are there on every page- but even
though they speak loudly, they speak in a particular mode. One
explanation for this appears in LDS itself in a discussion of women' s
cultural achievements to date: so far there has been no female genius.
What is missing is not some secret spring but an attitude that social
structures and conventions often obstruct: the attitude of the subject that
can throw itself fully into its projects, without worrying over what other
people will think, inspired only by the consciousness of its freedom and
the desire to realize its transcendence. As Beauvoir puts it, women
have remained too caught up in the world of things:
Les restrictions que I'education et la coutumne imposent ala
femme limitent sa prise sur l' univers; quand le combat pour
prendre place dans ce monde est trop rude, il ne peut etre
question de s'en arracher; or, il faut d'abord en emerger dans
une souveraine solitude si I'on veut tenter de s' en ressaisir: ce
qui manque d'abord ala femme c'est de faire dans I'angoisse
10
et I'orgueil I' apprentissage de son delaissement et de sa
transcendance. (LDS 11: 555)
Women have not yet come to terms with the fact that they are thrown
into the world and must assert themselves as transcendences. Beauvoir
directly refers here to Heidegger. Yet she doesn't identify that debt.
Nor does she do so elsewhere with other thinkers. Why not? An
answer may lie in her understanding of philosophy: "L'art, la
litterature, la philosophie sont des tentatives pour fonder aneuf le
monde sur une liberte humaine: celle du createur" (LDS 11: 555). As
concretizations of human beings' attempts to create the world anew and
found it not in matter but on human freedom, philosophy and art
become impersonal (or rather not gendered in the way we currently
understand that notion). The ideas that allow such a new founding no
longer belong to anyone in particular. What will it mean for feminist
theorists to adopt this view?
For one thing feminists will be able to confront male thinkers
with much less defensiveness and from a position of strength, for even
if the sexual politics of a Nietzsche may be offensive to many of us, his
project was part of all philosophers' efforts to ground the human in
something other than bnlte nature. And this is a very strong basis for
reclaiming some of his thought and rendering it useful for our futures.
The whole canon of male philosophers miraculously turned from
enemies into co-conspirators? Elizabeth Grosz probably meant
something along these lines when she recently challenged feminists to
reorient our energies from critique to production. Speaking about
"Feminist Futures" and demanding that we rethink the real and the
material, that some of us turn our attention to questions of ontology,
Grosz promoted what to many feminists would seem "very strange
alliances": to positively engage for instance Darwin, Bergson, or
Deleuze. Such an encounter with what is "alien" might be most
productive to feminism today.5 But to move from critique to
production also means moving beyond second-wave feminism. After
all, critique-the probing for sexist bias of the works of male poets,
novelists, philosophers and others, which furnish the conceptual
framework through which concrete historical individual experience
themselves- was a central aspect of second-wave feminist activity.
While certainly necessary, the problem with such critique is that it
consigns one to the position of respondent. Beauvoir chose production
5 Elizabeth Grosz, "Feminist Futures," MLA Convention, Washington,
D.C., 28 December 2000.
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over critique and so situated herself in a way that would make it harder
for second-wave feminism fully to enlist her work on its side. But the
situation is different now. Should we add to Grosz' s list of candidates
for promising new alliances the name of Beauvoir? One thing is
certain: Beauvoir has never been a second-wave feminist.
There remains the tricky issue of the text' s historicity. Doesn't
the very fact that its analysis of the situation of woman is based on the
special situation of French bourgeois women of the second third of the
twentieth century limit its value? Over the past fifty years their
situation clearly has changed dramatically. Also it variously has been
pointed out that Beauvoir overgeneralizes, that she doesn't attend to
how differences of class, ethnicity, and race affect concrete women'ls
lives- in sum, it would seem that the very sensitivities that feminists
today expect of any text are missing from hers. Attention to the
demands of historicity then would seem to require one to leave LDS in
the safe space of the feminist historical museum where is has been
sleeping for so longe We could even enlist Beauvoir' s own insistence
that one analyze women' s "lived experience" against her. But it seems
to us that the invocation of historicity doesn' t quite address the crucial
issue. LDS is precisely not a sociological text. As a philosophical text,
defined in the terms Beauvoir outlines above, it reflects on how, for
women, the fundamental project of any human being-to inscribe
oneself on the world and create meaning-has been thwarted by force
and through women's complicity. The human species, Beauvoir insists
in the final chapter, is something other than a species; it is a historical
becoming and defines itself by how it assurnes its natural facticity (LDS
11: 560). A profound consciousness of historicity is thus inscribed at
the center of the text.
Beauvoir saw LDS as part of a new generation' sattempts to
understand and analyze women's situation ("un effort de lucidite"; LDS
I: 30). What do we stand to gain from areturn to it? What can LDS do
for a reinvigorated feminism? It seems to us-and the contributors to
this volume confmn this-that there are three areas of scholarship in
particular that may benefit from a critical re-reading of LDS: the
analysis of the body and embodiment; the question of agency; and
finally, the question of the subject. For reasons of space we can only
sketch here Beauvoir' s possible contributions.
Strongly influenced by the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty,
Beauvoir rejects as inadequate any understanding of the body that
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remains based in dualism. The body is neither pure matter, nor
instnlment, nor a prison. It does have a material dimension but its
concreteness consists in the fact that it is our means for understanding
the world around uso We perceive the world through and with our
body: "Chez les filles et les gar<;ons, le corps est d"abord le
rayonnement d'une subjectivite, l' instrument qui effectue la
comprehension du monde: c'est atravers les yeux, les mains, non par
les parties sexuelles qu'ils apprehendent l'univers" (LDS 11: 13). Two
points seem worth making: first, the body in Beauvoir' s understanding
cannot be reduced to sexuality, even if sexuality needs to be considered
in any productive account of embodiment (this is, of course, part of
Beauvoir' s critique of Freud). If sexuality nonetheless appears to
function as synecdoche for the totality of the body, is this an instance of
what Heidegger means when he argues that an object appears as object
only secondarily after the relations of meaning that bring it into the
realm of the visible and the experiential have been suppressed? What
relations of meaning have been obscured in order for sexuality to
emerge that way? What would it mean to restore them to the realm of
the visible? Second, Beauvoir"s body is both in situation and a
situation in itself. In other words, the way I experience the world will
inflect my very experience of my body and vice versa. My body thus is
a way of living the world and living in it. It is historical in more than
the ordinary sense: as my self it continually transforrns itself and is a
becoming up to my death. It is this understanding of embodiment, this
interpretation of femininity as an entire complex of economic, social,
psychological, and physical meanings bound up with an individual's
concrete choices, that is the subject of volume two of LDS,
"L'Experience vecue"-"Lived Experience," not Parshley's
sociologizing "Woman's Life Today."
As we discussed earlier, Beauvoir recasts our ordinary
understanding of agency. For her, every individual acts at every
moment; it is one of our defining traits as human beings: we do things.
Although the circumstances under which we live our lives are not of our
choosing, within those limits-whether severely or only moderately
constraining- we still choose to do one thing rather than another. As a
result, agency is not reserved to describing only that privileged class of
actions that express resistance. Nor is it opposed to what we usually
call passivity. In fact, Beauvoir spends a good deal of effort describing
the many ways in which women are being tempted to forgo their
fulfillment as human beings and consent to being an Other. As such an
Other-passive, congealed into a quasi object- a whole range of
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actions remains open except those that would let her actualize her
freedom and make her confront her metaphysical responsibility of
justifying her existence. Thus the pertinent distinction is not between
agentlactive and victimlpassive but rather between authentic and
inauthentic acts. Both kinds actualize meanings but only the former
open existence out to an unknown. (Authenticity, one might want to
add, refers to whether I dare to fully assurne my humanity; it has
nothing at all to do with adhering to the trodden paths of tradition
(however defined) and is in fact incompatible with it.)
Beauvoir' s perspective on subjectivity offers something
productive to current feminist theory also. As she does with regard to
the body, here as weIl Beauvoir rejects a static dualism and highlights
relationality: I become a subject only with and through the encounter
with another subject, which I thereby make into my object. The other
subject does the same with me. In other words, my status as a subject
arises only in opposing myself to another consciousness. Alterity thus
constitutes a fundamental aspect of human existence and is anchored in
our thought as a basic category:
La categorie de I'Autre est aussi originelle que la conscience
elle-meme.... [L]e sujet ne se pose qu'en s'opposant: il
pretend s' affirmer comme I'essentiel et constituer I'autre en
essentiel, en objet. (LDS I: 16-17)
What does that mean? For one, it would seem to pull the rug from
under the easy denunciation of practices of othering as expressions of
false consciousness. Second, as Beauvoir also points out, it destroys as
a fiction the notion that reality rests on a Mitsein based on supposedly
originary feelings of friendship and solidarity between individual
consciousnesses (LDS I: 17).
All this has a profound effect on how we conceptualize groups
and their cohesion. If there is no originary solidarity, not even a neutral
attitude of indifference but rather a fundamental hostility between
individual consciousnesses, groups can only constitute themselves in
two ways: either the groupness is violently imposed from the outside, or
the individuals who want to constitute themselves into a group must
permanently work at producing relations of friendship and solidarity.
In other words, sisterhood, one of the comerstones of much feminist
thought, is not a natural phenomenon that can be taken for granted.
Jane Gallop recently addressed the issue in her characteristically
irreverent fashion and challenged feminists to develop a new model for
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thinking about women's groups that would notjust make aspace for
conflict and struggle between women but treat disagreement as
foundational. Sisterhood as we know it projects immediate
understanding and shared interests between women; the eruption of
disagreement where the ideology of sisterhood foresees only harmony
therefore by necessity plunges the group into crisis. Why not abandon
the term altogether? Instead of invoking a fantasy sisterhood that hasn't
even held up in one' s concrete relations with one' s biological sisters,
feminists could embrace, Gallop suggests, a "rhetoric of difference.,,6
Concerted action must be forged in conflict and through negotiation; its
conditions of possibility are never just "there." As Beauvoir put it so
weIl, in contrast to the proletariat and Blacks, women historically have
had trouble to say "We":
Si la femme se decouvre comme l' inessentiel qui jamais ne
retourne aI'essentiel, c' est qu'elle n'opere pas elle-meme ce
retour. Les proletaires disent « nous ». Les Noirs aussi. Se
posant comme sujets ils changent en « autres » les bourgeois,
les Blancs. Les femmes-sauf en certains congres qui restent
des manifestations abstraites-ne disent pas « nous »; les
hommes disent « les femmes » et elles reprennent ces mots
pour se designer eIles-memes; mais elles ne se posent
authentiquement comme Sujet. (LDS I: 18)
Composed by more than a dozen feminists and philosophers
from Belgium, Canada, China, France, Germany, the Congo, and the
United States, the essays and testimonies in this collection illustrate
what kind of work has emerged and continues to emerge from reading
and critically re-engaging LDS. Our objective, once again, is not
hagiography. Rather we want to recover the traces of Beauvoir (as, for
example, does Dai Jinhua in her fascinating account of LDS' s
unexpected new life in post-socialist China), make visible the text's
everyday life, and explore how we can turn Beauvoir' s articulation of
philosophy and feminism to use for our own times.
University of Minnesota Sabine Engel
6 Jane Gallop, "Econstructing Sisterhood," The Singer Memorial
Conference, Miami University, Oxford (OH), 6 April 2001.
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